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Myth of Shareholder Primacy in English Law 
 
Jonathan Mukwiri
*
 
 
Abstract 
 
This article assesses the validity of the shareholder primacy norm, with particular focus on 
the pre and post Companies Act 2006 implications of shareholder primacy in English 
company law.  Prior to the Companies Act 2006, much was written about shareholder 
primacy, which assumed it to be the basis of corporate governance in English law.  In testing 
the validity of that assumption, this article examines the historical application of partnership 
principles to corporate governance, the case law often called in aid of the shareholder 
primacy norm, and finds that shareholder primacy remains at odds with the tenet of corporate 
legal personality in English law.  It concludes that the assumption that shareholder primacy 
was the basis of corporate governance in English law is a myth. 
 
I. Introduction 
 
This article is concerned with shareholder primacy in English company law.  Shareholder 
primacy provides preeminence to shareholders over other corporate constituencies.  It infers 
an obligation on directors to manage the corporation for the sole interest of shareholders.  
Critically the theory involves creating wealth for shareholders.
1
  The theory means that the 
principal sphere of the activities of the managers is defined by the obligation to shareholders, 
such that all other responsibilities are very much secondary or derivative.
2
  Critically, 
shareholder primacy equates the interests of a company with the interests of its shareholders. 
 
The ultimate shareholder primacy norm is that directors are agents of shareholders, and that 
directors are under fundamental obligation to run the company in the interest of the 
shareholders.  Prior to the Companies Act 2006 (hereinafter referred to as “CA 2006”), much 
was written about shareholder primacy,
3
 which assumed it to be the basis of corporate 
governance in English law.  But what has rarely been discussed is the validity of that 
assumption.  Was shareholder primacy a legal norm in English law prior to the CA 2006?  
Did the case law that are purported to have supported shareholder primacy really support it? 
In answering these questions, this article finds that the confusion was based on the historical 
application of partnership principles to company law, and that a contextual reading of case 
law reveals that shareholder primacy is at odds with the tenet of corporate legal personality. 
 
By virtue of section 172 of the CA 2006, the concept of Enlightened Shareholder Value, 
which is an extension of Shareholder Primacy norm, appears to be enshrined into English law 
as the basis of corporate governance.  Section 172 requires directors to act in the way that 
would be most likely to promote the success of the relevant company for the ‘benefit of its 
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members’ as a whole, and to have regard to the interests of other stakeholders.  The questions 
here are twofold.  One, should we read into section 172 a strict shareholder primacy norm or 
should we read the phrase ‘benefit of its members’ as a mere yardstick for assessing the duty 
therein?  Two, if we read into section 172 a strict shareholder primacy norm, does the tenets 
of company law as understood at common law enable the shareholders to enforce qua 
shareholders the duty therein?  In answering those questions, this article finds that a reading 
of shareholder primacy into section 172 would be at odds with the legal personality tenet and 
would provide shareholders with a right without corresponding enforcement legal remedy. 
 
The aims of this article are twofold: to examine the legal validity of the assumption of 
shareholder primacy in English law prior to the CA 2006, and to discuss the subsequent 
implications of shareholder primacy norm in English law in the context of section 172 of the 
CA 2006.  As to the first aim, this article examines the purported legal sources for the 
assumption rather than its merits.  This is on the premise that ‘whether a given norm is 
legally valid, and hence whether it forms part of the law of that system, depends on its 
sources, not its merit.’4  As to the second aim, this article focuses on the right created and its 
enforcement by shareholders qua shareholders in relation to the elementary tenet of corporate 
legal personality.  This is on the premise that ‘a right without a remedy is worthless.’5 
 
The article proceeds in the following way.  First, it examines the confusion created by 
partnership principles, blaming this as one cause for the assumption of shareholder primacy 
as a legal norm in English law prior to the CA 2006.  Secondly, it takes a contextual reading 
of English legal sources often purported to have supported shareholder primacy prior to the 
CA 2006.  Thirdly, it discusses the extent to which shareholder primacy norm has been 
enshrined into section 172 of the CA 2006 as a concept of enlightened shareholder value.  
Fourthly, it discusses the enforcement implications, in relation to the tenet of corporate legal 
personality, of reading shareholder primacy or enlightened shareholder value into section 172 
of the CA 2006.  Fifthly, it suggests an alternative reading of section 172 in order to align it 
with the tenets of English company law.  Lastly, it makes concluding remarks. 
 
II. Assumption of Shareholder Primacy Pre-CA 2006 
 
A. Partnership Law and Shareholder Primacy 
 
The question to be answered here is whether shareholder primacy was a legal norm in 
English company law prior to the CA 2006.  Answering in the negative, it is argued here that 
the confusion was based on the historical application of partnership principles to company 
law.  The corollary of shareholder primacy is to treat directors as trustees of shareholders, 
accountable to shareholders as the real company.  Such view is derived from nineteenth 
century partnership principles that treated shareholders as synonymous with the company.  It 
is said that company law, ‘of all branches of law, is perhaps the one least understood except 
in relation to its historical development.’6  It is in this context that to better understand the 
confusion that created the assumption of shareholder primacy prior to the CA 2006, an 
historical development of English company law needs to be noted. 
 
English company law traces its roots from partnership law through the nineteenth century 
joint stock company law, and ‘until the latter half of the century, it was considered and 
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treated as an adjunct of the law of partnership.’7  For early writers like Lindley, the title of 
their texts on company law merely appended company law to partnership law.
8
  Informed by 
these early texts, no wonder courts continued to apply partnership principles to companies 
until ‘when the idea of the legal personality of the company had permeated all the courts.’9  
This development from partnership law, through the application of partnership principles to 
the joint stock companies, explains the origins of the myth of shareholder primacy prior to 
the CA 2006 in company law debates. 
It is important to note that, in the nineteenth century, in treating joint stock companies as 
adjunct to partnership law, ‘the members, as partners, owned the assets, and their entitlement 
to the control and benefit of the company was, an incident of their legal ownership of the 
business.’10  But applying partnership law principles soon proved difficult.  ‘For example, if a 
partnership was to be sued it was necessary to make all the partners party to the suit.  While 
in a partnership of five or six this presented no difficulty, discovering the identity of all the 
members of a joint stock company, where the shares were freely transferable, posed an 
insuperable obstacle.’11  Company law had to transition, and thus the courts developed one of 
the fundamental tenets of modern company law, the legal personality of the company. 
 
Unfortunately, although company law did transition from partnership principles, with the 
fundamental tenet of separate corporate personality, the debates on shareholder primacy 
continued to be held in the shackles of partnership law.  It was observed that, ‘fuelled by the 
ownership myth and the legal remnants which sustain it,’ the debate in company law 
continued ‘rather to treat company and shareholders as in crucial respects synonymous.  As a 
result of this “anomalous hangover from earlier times,”’12 shareholder primacy was still 
assumed to be the basis of corporate governance in English company law.  Whereas English 
company law had since evolved from the shackles of partnership law, it seems that we had 
‘yet to bring shareholders’ entitlements as to the way a company is managed into line with 
this modern view of the company.’13 
 
It is said that, ‘the general idea of a corporation, a fictional legal person, distinct from the 
actual persons who compose it, is very old.’14  Indeed, as early as 1837, it was said that, ‘the 
individual members of a corporation are quite as distinct from the metaphysical body called 
“the corporation” as any others of his majesty’s subjects are.’15  The transition from 
partnership principles, from treating shareholders as synonymous with the company, was 
judicially settled by the seminal case of Salomon.
16
 From henceforth, it should have been 
difficult to advocate for shareholder primacy without offending the fundamental tenet of 
separate legal personality in Salomon.  But a discussion that aligns shareholder primacy with 
the principle in Salomon has been rare in the literature.  To fully extend this transition to the 
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academic debates, it is here suggested that post Salomon cases ought to be interpreted in light 
of separate legal personality unless they unequivocally promote shareholder primacy. 
 
B. Law and Economics and Shareholder Primacy 
 
It is difficult to defend shareholder primacy in a legal system that does not recognise 
shareholders as owners of the company.  The idea of shareholders as owners of the company 
is foreign to English company law.
17
  In Bligh,
18
 the court rejected the idea of shareholders as 
owners, and took the view that shareholders only had interests in the profits of the company 
and no interest whatsoever in the assets of the company.  The same view was taken in 
Watson.
19
 In Short, Evershed LJ, denying that shareholders were owners of the company, 
said: ‘shareholders are not, in the eye of the law, part owners of the undertaking.  The 
undertaking is something different from the totality of the share-holdings.’20 Moreover, 
directors have exclusive rights to manage the company and cannot be ordered by the 
shareholders.
21
 Thus, in English law, whilst shareholders have rights to dividend on shares 
and right to transfer their shares, they do not own the company; which makes shareholder 
primacy difficult to defend. 
 
In defending shareholder primacy, ‘economists argue that when corporations are run to 
maximise shareholder value, the performance of the economy as a whole, not just the interest 
of shareholders, can be enhanced.’22  The problem though, ‘econometrics is frequently, and 
rather frustratingly, too clumsy a tool for the study of corporate law.’23  It has been argued 
that, ‘neither in theory nor in practice, is it true that maximising the value of equity shares is 
the equivalent of maximising the overall value created by the firm.’24  Moreover, shareholder 
primacy is not a product of English law, but rather of the ‘US academics who have been 
largely responsible for developing the theories which try to rationalise and legitimate both 
neo-liberalism and Anglo-American style shareholder primacy.’25  Being largely a norm of 
law-and-economics, it is no wonder that there is no unequivocal thread in English legal 
sources entrenching shareholder primacy into English company law. 
 
In their study, Lele and Siems,
26
 the authors found that the UK corporate governance was 
neither clearly shareholder oriented nor stakeholder oriented.  In fact, the result of their study 
raises doubts as to the validity of shareholder primacy in other countries besides the UK.  The 
study looked at shareholder protection in five countries: the UK, the US, Germany, France, 
and India.  In examining whether the boards in these countries always has to give priority to 
shareholders interests or to the interests of other stakeholders, the study found no clear 
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evidence of either.  As Gelter observed, ‘shareholder primacy is not enforceable – it all 
depends on how incumbents rationalize their decision.’27  In light of the Foss v Harbottle 
tenet, shareholder primacy can only create a legal right with no corresponding legal remedy. 
 
The conclusion drawn by Hansmann and Kraakman that corporate governance is now settled 
in favour of shareholder primacy,
28
 is mainly an academic perspective,
29
 and has not support 
in English company law.
30
  In their study of corporate governance in the UK, Armour, 
Deakin and Konzelmann, rejected Hansmann and Kraakman’s claim that corporate control is 
now settled in favour of the shareholder value model.  Armour, Deakin and Konzelmann 
concluded that, the UK corporate governance system, ‘rather than stabilizing around a norm 
of shareholder primacy, is currently in a state of flux.’31  But were we to accept that 
shareholder primacy is now entrenched into English company law by section 172, there 
would still remain the question of aligning it with directors’ duties.  It is difficult for the 
courts to assess whether directors have in fact maximised profits, so the idea that shareholder 
value allows for more assessment of what directors do is illusory.
32
 
 
III. Contextual Reading of pre-CA 2006 English Cases 
 
A. Introduction to pre-CA 2006 Cases 
 
The question here is whether pre-CA 2006 case law that are purported to have supported 
shareholder primacy really supported it.  A closer look at the assumption of shareholder 
primacy in the literature, in the context of English law, reveals that shareholder primacy was 
only a theory and not a legal norm, it was sustained by academics and not by the courts, and 
its analysis was mainly not from a legal perspective, but from economics perspective.  On the 
premise that ‘whether a given norm is legally valid, and hence whether it forms part of the 
law of that system, depends on its sources, not its merits,’33 we now turn to the legal sources. 
 
A number of pre-CA 2006 cases were often quoted in support of shareholder primacy.  It is 
here observed that none of these cases provided an unequivocal support to shareholder 
primacy, in the sense that the interests of the company are equated absolutely with those of its 
shareholders.  By proof text method, one can find cases that support shareholder primacy in 
English law.  The preferred method in this article is a contextual reading of such cases.  There 
is a dire need for exposition of these cases in company law texts, but unfortunately “the 
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tendency among company lawyers is to deal with these problems by discrete omission.”34 But 
were company lawyers to engage in a contextual analysis of the array of case law, most 
would accept that modern company law has long transitioned from partnership principles that 
equated shareholders with companies as synonymous, and hence post nineteenth century 
cases ought to be read in the context of such transition, in the light of the Salomon separate 
legal personality,
35
 unless the cases in question unequivocally promotes shareholder primacy. 
 
B. Hutton v West Cork Railway Company 
 
The main case often quoted as supporting shareholder primacy is Hutton,
36
 where Directors 
had set out to award a gratuity to corporate officers for their past service.  In ruling this 
proposal as unlawful, because it did not benefit the company to do so, Bowen LJ observed: 
‘the law does not say that there are to be no cakes and ale, but there are to be no cakes and ale 
except such as required for the benefit of the company.’37  Clearly, Hutton did not refer to the 
interests of shareholders but of the company, and hence did not equate the interests of the 
company with those of its shareholders.  Confusingly, there are some company law textbooks 
that apply Hutton to shareholder primacy in the sense that ‘it is unlawful to give the workers 
anything unless it is good for the shareholders.’38 
 
A contextual reading of Hutton reveals that the case concerned an injunction by shareholders 
to restrain the company from entering an ultra vires act, and had nothing to do with 
shareholder primacy.  Shareholders argued successfully that it was ultra vires for the 
company, by its directors, to award gratuitous wages to its former employees on cessation of 
business.
39
  Shareholders in Hutton simply brought an action for the wrong on the company 
under one of the established exceptions to the rule in Foss v Harbottle, and were not asserting 
shareholder primacy. 
 
In Hutton though, Bowen LJ referred to ‘benefit of the company,’ but did not say what that 
means.  As this was a case where the company was insolvent, does it follow that shareholder 
primacy applied on grounds of residual rights, as to reduce ‘benefit of the company’ to the 
interests of actual humans who would survive the company’s demise?  The answer is no.  For 
a contrary reading of Hutton fails to identify what residual rights the shareholders have.  If 
their residual rights are to have the company’s assets managed for their benefit, then all 
follows; but if their residual rights are to the residue after the assets have been managed in a 
different way, then the rights will not support the allegation that the assets must be managed 
in the interests of the shareholders.
40
  Thus, residual rights do not assert shareholder primacy, 
for that comes too late when management of assets has ceased but the liquidating of assets in 
dissolution. 
 
C. Gaiman v National Association for Mental Health 
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In some cases, the courts have referred to shareholders as the human equivalent of the 
company.  One such example is found in Gaiman.
41
  A contextual reading of Gaiman reveals 
that the use of shareholders as a human equivalent of the company was a matter of a 
pragmatic reckoning based on the social reality of the company as opposed to the legal 
acceptance of shareholder primacy, in assessing the nature of the interests of the company in 
that particular case.  It would be out of context to suppose that Gaiman supports shareholder 
primacy. 
 
In Gaiman, Megarry J, in holding that a company is ‘an artificial legal entity,’ observed that 
‘it is not very easy to determine what is in the best interest of the association without paying 
due regard to the members of the association.’  It is to this difficulty, as a pragmatic 
reckoning, that Megarry J referred to ‘members of the association’ as ‘a helpful expression of 
a human equivalent’ of the company, in answering the question, did the directors ‘act as they 
did in the bona fide belief that it was in the best interest of the association?’ to which 
question he answered, ‘yes.’42  Megarry J’s remarks merely illustrate the difficulties one gets 
into if one strays from the simplicity of the entity principle of the company.  But the 
existence of the corporate entity as a separate person from its shareholders cannot be denied 
merely because of the difficulties one encounters in determining what is in best interest of 
that entity. 
 
Similarly, in assessing whether directors have discharged their duties to the company, when 
the company is insolvent, the courts have often referred to the benefit of creditors as interests 
of company.
43
  For example, in Re Pantone 485 Ltd, Richard Reid QC referred to creditor’s 
interests in assessing the interests of the company, as follows: 
 
In my view, where the company is insolvent, the human equivalent of the company for 
the purpose of the directors’ fiduciary duties is the company’s creditors as a whole, ie its 
general creditors.  It follows that if the directors act consistently with the interests of the 
general creditors but inconsistently with the interest of a creditor or section of creditors 
with special rights in a winding-up, they do not act in breach of duty to the company.
44
 
 
Both Meggary J and Richard Reid QC were using shareholders and creditors, respectively, to 
assess the interests of the company.  As the references to shareholders and creditors in these 
cases are only tools to aid the assessment of the company’s interests, we cannot draw from 
them a theory to support shareholder primacy. 
 
D. Brady v Brady 
 
The other case also often quoted in support of shareholder primacy is Brady.
45
  The principal 
issue in this case was not about in whose interests should the directors run the company, and 
therefore did not set a precedent for shareholder primacy in English law.  The issue in the 
case revolved around disposition of company assets to a major shareholder, and breach of 
section 151 CA 1985.  The question was whether a trading company’s disposition of half its 
assets for the benefit of one of its two major shareholders was valid.  If we take shareholder 
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primacy to mean that the interests of the company equates to the interests of its shareholders, 
then the disposition in Brady was valid.  Any reading of shareholder primacy in Brady would 
have to find the disposition therein valid or else the very essence of shareholder primacy is 
questionable. 
 
There were two objections to the disposition of assets to the shareholder in Brady.  First, that 
it was ultra vires the company.  Secondly, that it involved the giving of unlawful financial 
assistance for the purposes of an acquisition of the company’s shares.  In answer to both 
objections, it was argued that the disposition was necessary in order to free the company from 
the deadlock which, if continued, would have brought it into liquidation. 
The judgment of Nourse LJ in the Court of Appeal is relevant in this discussion.
46
  Dealing 
with the first objection, Nourse LJ quoted a statement of principle by Pennycuick J in Ridge 
Securities Ltd v Inland Revenue Commissioners, as follows: 
 
A company can only lawfully deal with its assets in furtherance of its objects. The 
corporators may take assets out of the company by way of dividend or, with leave of the 
court, by way of reduction of capital, or in a winding up. They may, of course, acquire 
them for full consideration. They cannot take assets out of the company by way of 
voluntary disposition, however described, and, if they attempt to do so, the disposition 
is ultra vires the company.
47
 
 
To Nourse LJ, the principle was clear: company assets belong to the company.  He explained 
that the principle was a ‘facet of the wider rule, the corollary of limited liability, that the 
integrity of a company’s assets, except to the extent allowed by its constitution, must be 
preserved for the benefit of all those who are interested in them, most pertinently its 
creditors.’  To that extent, he stated that, ‘a unanimous resolution of all the shareholders 
authorising a company, however solvent, to perform an ultra vires act can no more withstand 
a liquidator’s trumpet than the walls of Jericho.’  That ‘a unanimous’ shareholder resolution 
would fall like Jericho at a liquidator’s trumpet, hardly supports shareholder primacy. 
 
The shareholders in Brady had clearly misunderstood English company law.  The company 
carried on a family business and the two major shareholders were brothers.  The brothers got 
into dispute, and a scheme was devised to divide the assets in two while keeping the company 
in being.  The perception of company law to the brothers was that of shareholder primacy, in 
the sense of equating the interests of the company to their own interests as shareholders, and 
thus could justify the proposition to divide the assets between themselves instead of seeking a 
remedy under section 122 of the Insolvency Act 1986.  In answer to the brothers’ perception, 
and contrary to shareholder primacy, Nourse LJ observed that ‘the fallacy in the proposition 
lies in its assumption that it is in the interests of a company to survive at any cost,’ on the 
contrary, he stated, ‘in some circumstances it must be in the interests of a company that it 
should be put into liquidation.’ 
 
As to the second objection in Brady, Nourse LJ observed that the question was whether the 
financial assistance was an incidental part of Brady’s larger purpose of keeping itself alive 
and was given in good faith in the interests of Brady, within section 153 CA 1985.  Assessing 
whether the disposition was in the interest of the company, Nourse LJ made several 
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observations before making the following dicta statement, which is often quoted supposedly 
in support of shareholder primacy: 
 
The interests of a company, an artificial person, cannot be distinguished from the 
interests of the persons who are interested in it. Who are those persons? Where a 
company is both going and solvent, first and foremost come the shareholders, present 
and no doubt future as well. How material are the interests of creditors in such a case? 
Admittedly existing creditors are interested in the assets of the company as the only 
source for the satisfaction of their debts. But in a case where the assets are enormous 
and the debts minimal it is reasonable to suppose that the interests of the creditors ought 
not to count for very much. Conversely, where the company is insolvent, or even 
doubtfully solvent, the interests of the company are in reality the interests of existing 
creditors alone.
48
 
 
Ostensibly, one can derive a shareholder primacy from the judgment of Nourse LJ in Brady.  
But it is difficult to derive a shareholder primacy from the quoted statement if understood 
from the larger context of the judgment as a whole.  A careful reading of the several 
observations made by Nourse LJ before making the quoted statement, clearly reveals that he 
did not promote the shareholder primacy. 
 
First, Nourse LJ observed that the expression ‘the interests of the company’ is one which is 
often used but rarely defined.  If rarely defined, it is hard to see how Nourse LJ would have 
concluded that English company law is based on shareholder primacy in the sense that those 
interests of the company meant the interests of shareholders.  He would have had to first 
define the expression to settle the question of shareholder primacy.  That shareholder primacy 
was not an issue he considered in his judgment, Nourse LJ left the expression undefined. 
 
Second, Nourse LJ observed that the expression ‘the interests of the company’ is sometimes 
misunderstood and it is possible that it has slightly different meanings in different contexts.  
If Nourse LJ meant to address the concept of shareholder primacy in the quoted statement, it 
would have necessitated him to first clear the misunderstandings and give the different 
meanings of the expression.  Nourse LJ neither attempted to clear the misunderstandings nor 
attempted to give the various possible meanings of the expression. 
 
Third, Nourse LJ categorically stated, in regard to the expression ‘the interests of the 
company,’ that ‘here I confine myself to a consideration of its meaning in a statutory 
provision whose object is to make a particular exception to the general prohibition against a 
company’s giving financial assistance for the purposes of an acquisition of its own shares.’  If 
so confined himself to the assessment of section 151 CA 1985, then we should be careful not 
to apply his statement to the general support of shareholder primacy in English company law. 
 
Contrary to supporting shareholder primacy, in Brady, Nourse LJ was of the view that the 
interests of the company included creditors and could be distinguished from its shareholders.  
In finding that ‘the directors never asked themselves whether half the assets would in all 
eventualities be sufficient to discharge all the existing, debts,’ he said that it could not be 
said, ‘for the purposes of an exception to the provisions of section 151, that the directors 
considered that the dispositions were in the interests of the two companies,’ and such, he 
concluded that ‘the most which can be said is that they considered that they were in the 
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interests of the shareholders.’49 As such, it is argued, Nourse LJ distinguished the interests of 
the company from those of the shareholders, and hardly promoted shareholder primacy. 
 
E. Greenhalgh v Arderne Cinemas 
 
Another proof text often quoted for shareholder primacy is from Greenhalgh, where 
Evershed MR stated that ‘“the company as a whole,” does not (at any rate in such a case as 
the present) mean the company as a commercial entity, distinct from the corporators: it means 
the corporators as a general body.’50 
Firstly, ‘the company as a whole’ is Delphic term employed by different judges in different 
circumstances to signify different things.
51
  In the context of the various cases using the term 
differently,
52
 it is not safe to draw from such inconsistence a conclusion of shareholder 
primacy. 
 
Secondly, Greenhalgh concerned a sale of personal property (shares), and therefore directly 
affected the interests of shareholders.  The dispute was inter-shareholders.  ‘In such context, 
it is hardly surprising that the interests of shareholders should be to the fore and, arguably, 
the interests of other corporate constituencies and the company as a commercial entity were 
simply not at stake.’53 
 
As such, the contextual reading of Greenhalgh reveals that Evershed MR was simply 
assessing whether a special resolution had been passed in the interest of the company on 
particular facts of a case that alleged that the resolution discriminated between the majority 
and the minority shareholders.  It is in that confinement of the case that ‘the company as a 
whole’ had to be assessed against the interests of all shareholders whose shares were affected 
by the special resolution.  Nothing in Greenhalgh sustains a shareholder primacy. 
 
Some cases that are often quoted in favour of shareholder primacy are, on contextual reading, 
cases dealing with acquisition of shares in takeovers, where special factual relationship place 
directors in a fiduciary capacity vis-à-vis the shareholders.  For example, in Heron,
54
 the case 
dealt with transfer of personal property (shares), in a takeover situation, an issue that directly 
affected the interests of shareholders.  It was to that effect, contrary to general shareholder 
primacy, that it was said that directors, when exercising their power under the articles to 
register a proposed transfer, ‘were under a fiduciary obligation to exercise the power in the 
interests of both the company and the shareholders,’ as it was in ‘the interests of all 
shareholders that they should not be deprived of an opportunity to sell their shares to the 
highest bidder.’55  Thus, in Peskin, it was said that, ‘fiduciary duties owed by directors to 
shareholders only arise if there is a special factual relationship between the directors and the 
shareholders.’56 In Dawson, it was stated that directors owed no general duty to shareholders, 
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except where a special case applied as in light of a takeover offer.
57
  Cases dealing with 
takeovers are therefore not cases that support shareholder primacy per se. 
 
IV. Section 172 CA 2006 and Shareholder Primacy 
 
Prior to the CA 2006, the debate espousing shareholder primacy, later developed by the 
Department of Trade and Industry (hereinafter referred to as ‘DTI’) into the concept of 
Enlightened Shareholder Value (hereinafter referred to as ‘ESV’), was based on a mistaken 
idea that shareholders are owners of the company.  ‘Despite the recognition of the company’s 
status as a distinct entity and the consequential displacement of shareholders as legal owners 
of the company’s assets,’58 the law reform bodies were still advocating for shareholder 
primacy based on the nineteenth century notion of shareholder ownership. 
 
The Cadbury Report observed: ‘Thus the shareholders as owners of the company elect the 
directors to run the business on their behalf and hold them accountable for its progress.’59 
The CLRSG was of the view that, ‘companies are formed and managed for the benefit of 
shareholders,’ and that ‘directors are required to manage the business on their behalf.’60  But 
the CLRSG did not derive this view from English decisions, but rather from academic 
debates on efficiency.  Quoting Easterbrook and Fischel, the CLRSG observed that, ‘the main 
economic justification offered for this approach is that members have greatest exposure to 
residual risk as a result of mismanagement of these resources and are therefore best qualified 
to ensure proper stewardship.’61  Based on this premise, the CLRSG advocated for the ESV 
concept,
62
 which was ostensibly enshrined in section 172.  But the apparent ESV in section 
172 is hence not based on any English legal source but on economics merits. 
 
ESV is an elevated notion of shareholder primacy, which seeks to strike a balance between 
the competing interests of different stakeholders in order to benefit the shareholders in the 
long run.
63
  At the root of both, the shareholders are the subjects in whose interests the 
company is to be run.  In both ESV and shareholder primacy, the directors are to discharge 
their duties by acting in good faith.  Applying section 172 CA 2006 to both, would require 
directors to act in the way they think would be most likely to promote the success of the 
company for the benefit of its members.  In both, a subjective test, what the director thinks as 
opposed to what the court thinks, would be applied to assess whether the directors have 
discharged their fiduciary duties.
64
  The discharge and assessment of this duty, whether under 
shareholder primacy or ESV, would be the same.  It is to this extent that, in this article, ESV 
and shareholder primacy are treated as synonymous. 
 
In 2005, the DTI saw the introduction of ESV into English law as one of the objectives of the 
legislative reform.  In reaching this objective, the Government set out to 
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embed in statute the concept of Enlightened Shareholder Value by making clear that 
directors must promote the success of the company for the benefit of its shareholders, 
and this can only be achieved by taking due account of both the long-term and short-
term, and wider factors such as employees, effects on the environment, suppliers and 
customers.
65
 
 
To the DTI, enshrining in statute a concept called “Enlightened Shareholder Value” meant 
that  
 
directors will be more likely to achieve long-term sustainable success for the benefit of 
their shareholders if their companies behave responsibly.  Directors will therefore be 
required to promote the success of the company in the collective best interests of 
shareholders, but must in doing so have regard to wider factors such as the interests of 
employees and the environment.
66
 
 
In this regard, ESV was seen as ‘a new approach’ of pursuing ‘the interests of shareholders’ 
in corporate governance.
67
 
 
What this ‘new approach’ really entailed was to equate the interests of the company with the 
interests of the shareholders albeit coached as ESV.  In answer to the elementary question, in 
whose interests should companies be run, the then UK Chancellor of Exchequer referred to 
the ‘enlightened shareholder value.’68  Taking ESV as synonymous with shareholder 
primacy, given that shareholder primacy was not a legal norm in English law prior to CA 
2006, section 172 not only introduced a ‘new approach’ to corporate governance, but also 
radically changed common law in that regard.  Section 172 (1) provides as follows: 
 
A director of a company must act in the way he considers, in good faith, would be 
most likely to promote the success of the company for the benefit of its members as a 
whole, and in doing so have regard (amongst other matters) to – 
(a) the likely consequences of any decision in the long term, 
(b) the interests of the company’s employees, 
(c) the need to foster the company’s business relationships with suppliers, customers 
and others, 
(d) the impact of the company’s operations on the community and the environment, 
(e) the desirability of the company maintaining a reputation for high standards of 
business conduct, and 
(f) the need to act fairly as between members of the company. 
 
Ostensibly, section 172 provides a reformulation of the common law duty to act in ‘the best 
interests of the company’ as a separate legal person from its shareholders.  It is said that 
section 172 ‘requires the promotion of the success of the company but not in its own right as 
a separate legal person but for the benefit of the shareholder constituency.’69  It is also said, 
of section 172, that ‘the rule of shareholder primacy is reiterated in the section.’70 
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 But a strict reading of shareholder primacy into section 172 is problematic.  It would mean 
that the law, by embedding shareholder primacy into section 172, has taken a retrograde step.  
It would require a radical reformulation of common law.  It would require unsettling the 
settled tenets of English company law, namely, separate legal personality,
71
 and to whom 
directors owe their duties,
72
 and aligning them with the ‘new approach’ in section 172.  The 
alternative to such a radical reformulation is to read less of shareholder primacy into section 
172, and to align the section with the settled tenets at common law. 
It is here argued that section 172 does not, as a matter of law, promote shareholder primacy, 
despites its ostensible reading.  At common law, the duty now in section 172, was to act in 
the interests of the company as a commercial entity separate from its shareholders.  The ‘new 
approach’ in section 172 abandoned the phrase for ‘in the interests of the company’ and 
adopted the phrase ‘the success of the company for the benefit of its members.’  The Law 
Society, opining that ‘the concept of the company as a legal entity separate from its members, 
and in whose interests the directors must act, is well understood,’ warned as follows: 
 
We remain concerned that “success” is too imprecise a concept to be helpful.  Unlike 
the phrase “in the interests of the company”, it is not supported by an existing body of 
case law.  Similarly, the fact that directors will be required to promote the company’s 
success “for the benefit of its members” raises new questions.  Under the existing law, 
the concept of the company as an entity separate from its members, and in whose 
interests the directors must act, is well understood.  It is far from clear that this will 
continue to be the case.
73
 
 
In section 172 drafters seem to have chosen ‘benefit of its members’ as the criterion by which 
the court should assess whether the directors have promoted the ‘success’ of the company.  
But from the legislative history, it would appear that the drafters chose this criterion on the 
basis of the confusion in the literature,
74
 and case law,
75
 as to the objective of the company.  
This confusion ignored the fact that the cases relied upon either concerned alteration of 
Articles affecting shareholding,
76
 or concerned breach of share purchase rules rather than 
breach of directors’ duties.77 
 
In answering the question in whose interests are companies run, the majority of case law 
prior to section 172 consistently required directors to manage company business, not for the 
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benefit of its members per se, but in the interest of the company.  In Re Smith & Fawcett Ltd 
Lord Greene MR said that directors should exercise their powers bona fide in what they 
consider to be ‘in the best interest of the company.’78  In Dorchester Foster J said that a 
director must exercise powers vested in him in good faith ‘in the interest of the company.’79 
 
It is argued here that a better reading of section 172 is to apply an economic concept to the 
phrase ‘success.’  Section 172 requires the directors to promote the ‘success’ of the company 
for the ‘benefit’ of its shareholders.  It is in this economic context that, as a minimum, 
directors’ achievement of that ‘success’ is to be measured by the ‘benefit’ to shareholders as 
the core constituency of the company.  The phrases ‘success’ and ‘benefit’ in section 172 
should be read in light of the separate legal personality, with the later reduced to a mere 
economic tool for measuring the former.  A reading of shareholder primacy into section 172 
fails to distinguish between legal entitlements and economic expectations of success.  The 
law should not, and cannot, insist on success.
80
  If a strict shareholder primacy were intended 
by section 172, it is here argued, section 170(1) would be of no effect. 
 
That the usage of the phrase ‘benefit of its members’ was intended only as a tool to aid the 
assessment of the duty is clear from section 170(1).  Section 170(1) unequivocally states that: 
‘The general duties specified in sections 171 to 177 are owed by a director of a company to 
the company.’  Moreover, section 170(4) provides: ‘The general duties shall be interpreted 
and applied in the same way as common law rules or equitable principles, and regard shall be 
had to the corresponding common law rules and equitable principles in interpreting and 
applying the general duties.’  Applying those rules and principles to section 172 suggests that 
the directors are under a fiduciary duty to the company to have regard to the interests of its 
members and other stakeholders such as employees,
81
 and the duty to have regard to the 
interests of its members is owed to the company rather than to the shareholders themselves 
individually or collectively.
82
 
 
Most company law textbooks are still grappling with the proper reading of section 172.  The 
proper reading of section 172 as been well stated in the textbook by Brenda Hannigan as 
follows: 
 
The position on these matters has not been altered by CA 2006, s 172.  The phrase ‘to 
promote the success of the company for the benefit of the members as a whole’ would 
appear to give greater weight to the interests of the current shareholders than to the 
commercial entity, but directors must also have regard to the consequences of any 
decision in the long term which suggests the interests of the commercial entity are as 
relevant now as they have always been.  The need to act fairly between members is 
also a specific factor to which the directors must have regard (s 172(1)(f)).  Overall, 
there is nothing to suggest that s 172 is intended to alter the balance between the 
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competing “entity” and “membership” interests which has already been established at 
common law.
83
 
 
V. Section 172 and Enforcement Remedy 
 
There are two possibilities to the requirements of section 172.  First, that the directors run the 
business in the interest of the company as a detached legal entity separate from its 
members,
84
 the implication being that directors’ duties are enforced by the company as a 
commercial entity.  Second, that the directors run the business in the interests of the members 
as the human equivalent of the company,
85
 the implication being that directors duties are 
enforced by shareholders as the company equivalent.  The DTI seem to have taken the second 
concept in developing the ESV.  If we accept a reading of shareholder primacy into section 
172, we would remain with the problem of enforcement by shareholders qua shareholders. 
 
To overcome the problem of enforcement, should we read section 172 as making a distinction 
between the identity of the person to whom the duties are owed (the company), and the 
question of the content of the duty as in whose interest the duty requires to be promoted (the 
shareholders)?  The answer is no.  It is trite law that directors owe their duties to the 
company.
86
  If that duty is breached, the company is the victim, and only the company can 
sue to right a wrong done to it.
87
  Yes, the shareholders can enforce the duties, collectively, 
under the derivative action, but that would in no way explain the distinction between the 
identity and content of the duty in answer to shareholder primacy. 
 
To equate the collective derivative action to promoting shareholder primacy is only a 
symptom of ‘anomalous hangover from earlier times,’88 which can only confine modern 
company law into the shackles of the nineteenth partnership principles. If we were to apply a 
distinction between the identity and content of the duty in section 172, that would create a 
duty in favour of shareholders who cannot enforce it qua shareholders.  Even with derivative 
actions, the proceedings are brought on behalf of the company and not qua shareholders; and 
‘any financial benefits from the action go into the company’s coffers,’89 and not into 
shareholders’ coffers. Further, shareholder primacy is not a prerequisite for derivative action. 
 
That shareholder primacy is not the basis of English company law, explains why courts 
would not hear a suit to right a wrong on the company if brought other than by or on behalf 
of the company even if all the shareholders (100 per cent) were in favour of the lawsuit.  An 
English judge is very likely to say to the shareholders’ advocate: ‘You have the wrong 
Plaintiff here – the Plaintiff must be the company.’90  To read shareholder primacy into 
section 172 would be to presuppose that English law allows for a legal declaration without 
any relief.  Section 172 would then confer rights on shareholders in the face of legal 
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principles that provide no enforcement of such right.  As directors’ duties would still be owed 
to the company, such conferment of rights would lead to no practical benefit to shareholders.  
As such, the lack of direct shareholder enforcement further undermines shareholder primacy. 
 
In economic terms, it would be efficient if directors promoted the success of the company by 
focusing on the ‘benefit of shareholders’ instead of the interests of the company.  Even then, 
it would require restating company law to have directors’ duties owed to shareholders, who in 
turn would hold directors accountable for breaches of their duties.  But to read this economic 
concept into section 172 would only create a legal right with no corresponding legal remedy.  
For in company law, ordinarily, until a company is in liquidation, or a successful takeover bid 
ensues, it is almost impossible for shareholders to bring an action and obtain a legal remedy 
for breach of duty against directors.  Even then, either the liquidator is interested in bringing 
an action against the directors, or the majority, having elected a new board of directors after a 
successful takeover, are willing to maintain an action against the old board.
91
 
 
In understanding the notion of ‘benefit to members’ in section 172, one ought to keep in mind 
that English company law is inclined to the interests of the company and not benefit of 
shareholders.  To start with, initial appointment of directors is usually on the formation of the 
company,
92
 and the law requires every company to have directors;
93
 shareholders have little 
choice in this process.  Once the company is formed, the general and day-to-day management 
of affairs of the company is vested in the directors;
94
 shareholders begin losing control.  The 
shareholders in a general meeting have no power to give instructions to the directors on 
matters of day-to-day management, and nor can the shareholders overrule the business 
decisions of directors, unless the directors are acting contrary to the constitution.
95
 
 
However, the shareholders in a general meeting can remove directors by an ordinary 
resolution,
96
 and they retain ultimate strategic control by virtue of their ability to alter the 
articles by which mechanism they can (for example) restrict the future powers of the 
directors.
97
  In theory, shareholders may remove and replace directors who fail their duty to 
promote the success of the company in a manner that adds value to shares.  In practice, the 
cost of removing directors and replacing them may not serve the collective interests of 
shareholders.
98
 
 
There is the impediment to shareholders’ litigation under the rule in Foss v Harbottle.99  But 
does lack of direct enforcement say anything about whether the corporate objective is or 
should be one aimed at shareholders?  The affirmative answer here is debatable.  The case 
law is this regard has historically been confusing.  It was said in Normandy that, ‘the 
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language by which [rule in Foss v Harbottle] is expressed varies so much that it is by no 
means easy to reconcile the whole of any one judgment with every other.’100  The rule in 
Foss v Harbottle is said to have its roots partly in the law relating to corporations and partly 
in partnership principles.
101
  But whether or not the lack of direct enforcement by 
shareholders explains the problem of reading shareholder primacy into section 172, ‘the 
mechanism employed nevertheless reflects a conception of the company that does not rest on 
shareholder proprietorship.’102 
The complexity of ownership in a company further makes it difficult for shareholders to 
maintain an action against directors.  Shareholders own the shares in a company, but do not 
own the company itself.
103
 Directors are appointed by shareholders, but owe their duties only 
to the company and not to shareholders individually or collectively.
104
  If there is any breach 
of duty by the directors, shareholders may have no personal cause of action against directors.  
In investing into company shares, a shareholder ‘takes the risk that management may prove 
not to be of the highest quality,’ and ‘there is prima facie no unfairness to a shareholder in the 
quality of the management turning out to be poor.’105  With all these impediments and 
corporate structures, it is little addition to English company law to read into section 172 a 
shareholder primacy. 
 
VI. Entity Principle as Alternative to Shareholder Primacy 
 
So far in this article, the argument is made that ‘there is nothing to suggest that s 172 is 
intended to alter the balance between the competing “entity” and “membership” interests 
which has already been established at common law.’106  With the shareholder primacy 
divorced from section 172, the answer to the elementary question in whose interests are 
companies run in the UK and to whom do directors owe their duties, is to be found in the 
analysis of the entity principle.  The simplicity of this principle is that it compares a company 
to a natural person – a judicial analogy that ‘a company is a legal person whose existence is 
bounded by events analogous to the birth and death of a natural person.’107 It is argued here 
that English law treats the company as an entity in its own right and not as an aggregate of 
shareholders. 
 
Lord Hoffmann’s analogy of a company to a natural person is helpful here.  We know that a 
natural person is one body with many parts.  What would happen to the body if the foot or the 
eye or the ear shall say, because I am not the hand, I am not part of the body?  Many parts 
with different functions makes up the body of a natural person, and the eye cannot say unto 
the hand, I have no need of you: nor again the head to the feet, I have no need of you, for the 
body would soon cease to function as the body.  The same applies to the company, with the 
shareholders and other stakeholders being the many parts of the body corporate with different 
functions.  None of these parts need take prominence over another, lest there be schism in the 
body corporate to its demise.  It is these many parts that directors ought to consider when 
discharging their duty owed to the company. 
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 The notion that a company is an entity separate from its incorporators goes beyond mere 
incorporation and legal fiction.  It was said by Dicey, “whenever men act in concert for a 
common purpose, they tend to create a body which, from no fiction of law but from the very 
nature of things, differs from the individual of whom it is constituted.”108  But far from being 
a legal fiction, the company is a real legal person, for the law, in recognising the existence of 
a company, is simply recognising an objective fact.
109
  Indeed, the personality of the 
company is a key aspect of the corporate form.
110
  It is therefore not controversial that “we do 
not need to be instructed to regard a corporation as an entity and to regard that entity as a 
person: our minds are so constituted that we cannot help taking that view.”111 
 
Although incorporation gives birth to a corporation, once the incorporators duly comply with 
the formalities of incorporation, the company thereafter has a life distinct and independent of 
its incorporators.  Historically though, the separation of company and members was not, as 
company lawyers tend to assume, inherent in the legal act of incorporation, but rather, the 
legal meaning of incorporation in a business context was reinterpreted in the latter half of the 
nineteenth century to accommodate the radical economic separation of joint stock companies 
from their shareholders.
112
  Moreover, the entity principle, that the company is ‘distinct from 
the actual persons who compose it, is very old.’113  Indeed, as early as 1837, it was said that, 
‘the individual members of a corporation are quite as distinct from the metaphysical body 
called “the corporation” as any others of his majesty’s subjects are.’114  In the context of 
incorporation, the entity principle was settled in Salomon, that 
 
once the company is legally incorporated it must be treated like any other independent 
person with its rights and liabilities appropriate to itself, and that the motives of those 
who took part in the promotion of the company are absolutely irrelevant in discussing 
what those rights and liabilities are.
115
 
 
The House of Lords maintained the same approach in Regal, where it was stated that ‘the 
company is at law a different person altogether from the subscribers to the memorandum.’116 
 
We can take further Lord Hoffmann’s analogy of a company to a natural person to aid in our 
understanding of the entity principle.  Man and woman decide to have a child.  Once the child 
is born, the child thereafter has a life distinct from the parents.  The motives of the parents in 
having a child are absolutely irrelevant in discussing the separate personality of the child.  If 
the parents intended the child look after them in their old age, if the child does not, the failure 
does not form any factor to consider in discussing the separate personality, rights and 
liabilities of the child. 
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What benefits the parents obtain from the child are a matter of relationship that may be based 
on contract.  As a matter of efficiency and morals, a child who has been educated by the 
parents and fortunate to have a good job, may find it wise to look after the parents in their old 
age.  The needs of the parents then become part of the interest of that working child.  But to 
insist, as a matter of duty, that the working child must exist for the purpose of serving the 
parents based on the fact that the parents gave birth to that working child, would be a claim 
society would find objectionable.  It is the interests of that working child and the relationship 
with the parents that determines whether the parents benefit from the working child’s wealth. 
 
In the same vein, what benefits shareholders obtain from the company are a matter of 
relationship that may be based on contract.  This was the case in Lee, where the widow of 
Lee who until his death had been the sole shareholder-director and employee of the company, 
successfully claimed worker’s compensation from the company’s insurer based on the 
contract her late husband, Lee, had with the company.  The court found that the relationship 
between Lee and the company ‘came about because the deceased as one legal person was 
willing to work for and to make a contract with the company which was another legal 
entity.’117 
 
The relationship between shareholders and the company is not one of ownership, but of 
contract.  ‘In order to understand shareholder rights in a British company, therefore, it is 
necessary to look first at the company’s articles of association and see what rights are 
established there.’118  To that end, section 33 of CA 2006 provides that, ‘the provisions of a 
company’s constitution bind the company and its members to the same extent as if there were 
covenants on the part of the company and of each member to observe those provisions.’  
Section 33 CA 2006 is to be interpreted as its predecessor, section 14 Companies Act 1985, 
which Astbury J in Hickman held that the section required the company to be ‘treated in law 
as a party to its own’ constitution.119  Indeed, the courts have always held that shareholders 
can sue the company based on the contractual relationship,
120
 and the company likewise 
could sue the shareholders.
121
  That the company can sue and be sued by its shareholders is 
based on the entity principle.  The company in English law is entirely separate from its 
shareholders, and the interests of shareholders cannot therefore validate the company’s 
existence. 
 
But shareholders cannot sue the directors qua shareholders if the company also suffers the 
wrong in question.  In Macdougall, the Articles provided power to the chairman to take a poll 
if demanded by five shareholders.  At the meeting, on proposing to adjourn, five shareholders 
demanded a poll, but the chairman refused and adjourned without a poll.  The shareholders 
sued the directors qua shareholders.  Following the rule in Foss v Harbottle, James LJ held 
that shareholders ought to have sued ‘in the name of the company’ in regard to the meeting in 
question, for he observed that ‘every meeting that is called must be for the purpose of doing 
or undoing something which is supposed to accrue for the benefit of the company’ and the 
suit, ‘if it was to be sustained at all, could only be sustained by the company.’122  Thus, the 
entity principle governed the litigation process. 
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On the other hand, the contractual relationship, on the basis of section 33 and the Articles of 
the company, is not an absolute contract in the strictest sense of a contact.  It is arguable, as 
observed in Swabey, between the company and its members, that ‘the Articles do not 
themselves constitute a contract, they are merely the regulations by which provision is made 
for the way the business of the company is to be carried on.’123  That is why it is better to 
explain the relationship between the company and the shareholders in terms of the entity 
principle.  The principle treats shareholders as one of the many parts of the body corporate 
without according them prominence as to confer special rights on them that would essentially 
amount to ownership claims upon the company. 
Once we stray away from the simplicity of the entity principle, underpinned by the legal 
personhood of the company, and thereby fail to treat shareholders as distinct from the 
company, then we cannot be consistent in explaining the rights of shareholders to sue the 
company under section 33 of CA 2006.  Both the shareholder primacy and stakeholder theory 
are economic endeavours of explaining the legal personhood of the company.  The problem 
here is that 
 
those arguing for an explanation of the company in economic terms tend to want to 
“have their cake and eat it.”  They wish to deny the personhood of the company and 
see the company as merely an aggregation of individuals in some circumstances, and 
at other times, particularly when it comes to liability issues and in other situations 
where it is pragmatically attractive, to invoke the separate personhood of the 
company.
124
 
 
English law does not buy into these economic explanations, but rather provide under section 
33 CA 2006 that the company and its shareholders are bound to each other in contractual 
relationship – treating both as distinctly separate personhoods. 
 
Long-term wealth need not focus on shareholder interest, but the entity in general, of which 
the shareholders are only one part of many constituencies. It can be argued that corporate 
governance in dispersed share ownership structure of English public companies is based on 
the entity principle.  For shareholders will buy and sell shares based on the value of the 
corporate shares and not individual shares on the market.  In focusing on the interests of the 
entity, with “success” measured against entity objectives or purpose, the directors will of 
course often take into account the various constituencies, but only to the extent of achieving 
entity interests.  It is the business judgement of the directors here that matter in determining 
what is in the best interest of the company.
125
  Where the directors fail in promoting the 
success of the company, it is for the company, not the shareholders, to hold the directors 
accountable.  This is why reading shareholder primacy into section 172, based on the phrase 
‘for the benefit of shareholders,’ is merely an economics and efficiency concept or creates a 
legal right with no corresponding enforcement legal remedy in English law. 
 
VII. Conclusion 
 
This article proceeded on the basis that prior to the CA 2006, the validity of shareholder 
primacy in English law was merely assumed.  The article examined the historical context of 
shareholder primacy and noted that the assumption was based on partnership principles that 
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treated shareholders as synonymous with the company.  Applying a contextual review of case 
law revealed no support for the conclusion that English law required directors to run the 
business in the interest of shareholders.  Pre-CA 2006 cases where the human equivalent of 
the company has been referred to, have always been a matter of a pragmatic reckoning based 
on the social reality of the company as opposed to the legal acceptance, in assessing the 
nature of the interests of the company.  Whereas arguments based on law and economics 
provides the merits of shareholder primacy, these do not validate the assumption of 
shareholder primacy as a legal norm.  As such, this article has drawn a conclusion that 
shareholder primacy in English company law pre-CA 2006 was a myth. 
 
This article noted that section 172 CA 2006 appear to introduce shareholder primacy into 
English law.  However, it is difficult to read shareholder primacy into section 172 without 
undermining the elementary tenets of English company law – the separate legal personality of 
the company and to whom directors owe their duties.  A reading of shareholder primacy into 
section 172 would create a legal right in favour of shareholders with no corresponding legal 
remedy in English law for shareholders to enforce qua shareholders.  Examining the 
historical context of and applying a contextual reading of section 172 CA 2006, this article 
found that English company law is based on the entity principle, which best explains the 
basis of corporate governance in modern English company law. 
